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CAPITALIST RICE FARMING AND LAND ALLOCATION
IN NORTHERN GHANA
Piet Konings
The recent introduction of capitalist rice farming in the
Gbedembilisi Valley - a river valley located in the south-east of
the Builsa Traditional Area in the Upper Region of Ghana - has
given rise to the emergence of a small class of mainly stranger
and partly absentee farmers within local peasant communities.
They have been attracted to large-scale, mechanized rice pro-
duction by high state subsidies and relatively easy access to
loans from the banks. This class of capitalist rice farmers has
been highly dependent on local peasant communities for the allo-
cation of land suitable for large-scale, mechanized rice produc-
tion and for the supply of (casual) labor. It will be shown in
this study that land allocation to capitalist rice farmers has re-
sulted in: (i) various abuses of "customary" land law by both
local chiefs and stranger farmers; (ii) a protracted conflict be-
tween local peasant communities, on the one hand, and stranger
farmers and the state, on the other, about control over Builsa
lands, the so-called Gbedembilisi Valley Dispute; and (iii) an
attempt by the Builsa Traditional Council (BTC) to effect
changes in the "customary" land law in order to "regulate" land
allocation to capitalist rice farmers.
The study is based on fieldwork in the Gbedembilisi Valley dur-
ing the 1979/80 farming season. Various methods were used to
gather the data and to increase their reliability. The most impor-
tant were: consultation of written material in several libraries,
archives and offices in Ghana; unstructured (or partially
structured) interviews with relevant informants at the local, dis-
trict, regional and national level; and in particular, participant
observation at the local level. In addition, extensive surveys
were held at the local level (see Konings 1983: 20-23).
This article documents, first, the changes effected in Builsa
customary land law during the colonial period and the superimpo-
sition of a "modern" land. law System; next, it describes the
development of capitalist rice farming in the Gbedembilisi Valley
and the system of land allocation by local chiefs to capitalist rice
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farmers; and, finally, it analyzes the so-called Gbedembilisi Val-
ley Dispute and the subsequent attempt to bring about changes
in the customary land law in order to adapt it to the realities of
capitalist rice farming in the Gbedembilisi Valley.
Pre-Colonial Builsa Socio-Econotnic Organization and the Land
Tenure System
Recently the Builsa socio-economic organization, which shows
some striking similarities with that of the neighboring Tallensi
(Fortes 1945, 1949), has been studied by a group of German
ethnologists (Schott 1970, 1977, 1980a and b; Kroger 1978, 1982;
and Heermann 1981). Builsa society was a segmentary, patrilineal
society, like Tallensi society. Chieftainship seems to have been
unknown till immigrants imposed it on at least some of the auton-
omous settlements in the area (Schott 1977). However, it would
appear that these newly appointed chiefs wielded very little ac-
tual political and legal power during the pre-colonial era. Social
control, sanctioned by religion, continued to be exercised by the
compound heads and clan elders, in particular the teng-nyono
(pi. teng-nyam), the "lord" or "priest" of the Earth (Schott
1980a and b; Kroger 1982). The teng-nyono, usually the most
senior elder of the oldest resident clan section, was called upon
to make sacrifices to the Earth (teng) whenever the settlement
was threatened by drought, a locust invasion, pestilence, or
war. His duties included arbitration in the frequent conflicts at
both intra-clan and extra-clan levels, because these were be-
lieved "to pollute the Earth".
Every compound in the Builsa dispersed settlements constituted
an economically self-sufficient production and consumption unit
under the command of the compound head, usually the most se-
nior male member of the household. The compound head could
command the labor power of all household members and dispose
of the surplus; in return, hè was obhged to provide equitably
for the needs and wants of the household members. The most
important economie activity was agriculture, mainly for subsis-
tence purposes (though a small surplus was often marketed).
The use of rudimentary agricultural tools like the hoe, axe and
cutlass always restricted agricultural production. In addition to
farming, the Builsa kept poultry, sheep, goats and cattle for
domestic consumption, for sale (in particular when food supplies
got exhausted), and for religieus purposes (sacrifices). Cattle
were particularly valued and constituted the main source of so-
cial differentiation among the Builsa. During the agricultural
off-season, the Builsa were mostly involved in hunting, trapping
and fishing, to supplement the family food supplies and for
trade. Many Builsa, moreover, were specialists in various kinds
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of crafts including weaving, pottery, and leather and metal
works (Akanko 1974; Heermann 1981).
These economie activities made the Builsa largely dependent on
land. Rights to land were handed down in the unwritten code of
the Builsa land tenure system. According to Builsa beliefs, land
is a goddess (the Earth) and belongs to the spirit (wen) of the
ancestors. The living enjoy only usufructuary rights. The teng-
nyam, lineage-elders and compound heads, act as custodians of
the ancestral lands.
Uncultivated lands - as well as rivers, forests, roads etc. - feil
under the direct control of the teng-nyono. On such land, every
member of the Community was free to graze his cattle, to gather
fruits and woods, and to fish and hunt. The teng-nyono could
allocate pieces of these uncultivated lands to anyone - whether
community member or stranger - to sustain himself and his de-
pendants. Land allocated in this way was not paid for, except
for the customary offering of "kolanuts and tobacco". Land could
never be sold, not only because it was abundant in the Builsa
area and had not acquired any commercial value as yet, but also
because it was held to belong to the ancestors and as such had
to be passed on to the future generations intact. Moreover, the
sale of land was regarded as an act that might incur the wrath
of the Goddess of the Earth and hence cause epidemics and
deaths. While land allocated to members of the community be-
came, following the teng-nyono's performance of the necessary
rites, their inalienable and heritable "property", strangers, on
the other hand, only enjoyed usufructuary rights for an unspec-
ified period subject to good behavior and observance of the
norms of the community. In principle, the strangers1
usufructuary rights could always be revoked. After harvest,
both community members and strangers were expected to hand
over a small portion of their produce to the teng-nyono as a
token of appreciation.
The lineage-elders controlled the land inhabited and cultivated
by their ancestors. Membership of a lineage entitled a family,
or, strictly speaking, the family-head, to usufructuary rights to
lineage land. Land that was no longer being cultivated could be
allocated by the lineage elder to another family. Lineage land not
needed by lineage members could sometimes be given to
non-lineage members or even to strangers for a specific period
of time following the presentation of the customary offering of
"kola and tobacco" (as well as a small portion of the produce).
Today, still, the family-head may allocate some family land to in-
dividual members of the family (and sometimes even to persons
outside the family). Generally speaking, land is allocated only to
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fact marked the beginning of the growth of an ethnic con-
sciousness among the Builsa (Konings 1981a).
It transferred the Builsa area, as the whole of Northern
Ghana, into a labor reserve for the South Ghanaian export
economy (Songsore 1979; Plange 1979; Konings 1981a and b) .
Initially, coercion by the colonial authorities - assisted by
the chiefs - proved necessary to extract labor from the
Builsa peasant communities (Thomas 1973). Various kinds of
administrative measures (like starving the Builsa area of
development funds) and the growing need for cash created
by the colonial economy were, however, among the most im-
portant factors promoting a "voluntary" flow of Builsa labor
to the South. At the end of the colonial period about 30% of
all occupied Builsa males were enumerated as being employed
outside their home area (Ghana Population Census 1960).
b. Changes effected in the Customary Land Tenure System
The colonial administration's strengthening of the chiefs1 authori-
ty weakened the position of the teng-nyono in Builsa society.
Formerly, chiefs "used to command people not land" (1), but
gradually they came to acquire a large measure of control over
land as well. Today, the Builsa paramount chief, the Sandemnab,
and his elders claim that allodial title to Builsa land is vested in
the paramount chief who holds the land in trust for the benefit
of the people; the day-to-day administration of land is delegated
to the local chiefs on behalf of the paramountcy and to the
teng-nyam. (2) Nowadays, if a member of the Community wants
to acquire a piece of uncultivated land, hè has to obtain permis-
sion from the local chief; the latter, in turn, has to consult the
teng-nyono first before giving his permission. Only after the
chief has given his consent and the teng-nyono has performed
the necessary rites, is a member of the community concerned
allowed to begin cultivating the land in question. In case of allo-
cation of land to strangers, it would, however, seem that local
chiefs have to seek authorization from the paramount chief first
before Consulting the teng-nyono. Members of the community as
well as strangers are at present expected to offer a small portion
of the produce after harvest to both the chief and the
teng-nyono.
c. Superimposition of a "Modern" Land law on the "Neo-
Traditional" Land Tenure System
The colonial administration created a dichotomy in the land law in
Ghana, whereby all lands in Northern Ghana became vested in
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In 1927, a Land and Native Rights Ordinance was proposed, de-
cïaring all lands in the North "public lands" - without any prior
consuftation having taken place with the Northern chiefs and
neoole (Der 1975). This Ordinance was vehemently opposed by
the Southern Ghanaian educated elite in the Legislative Council
as well as by the Ghanaian newspapers. Both this Ghanaian pro-
test and the Colonial Office's dissatisfaction with the Ordinance
induced the colonial administration to amend it m 1931 and to
recognize Northern lands as being "native lands». However the
»management, control and administration of 'native lands"' was
vested in the governor, in trust for the people of Northern
Ghana. The 1931 Land and Native Rights Ordinance empowered
Se Governor to grant rights of occupancy to "Natives and
Non-Natives" and to extract a rent in respect of rights of occu-
pancy so granted (Agbosu 1978). The far-reachmg effects of
Kis Ordinance were: (i) that chiefs and teng-nyam were exclud-
ed from the administration and management of the land m their
areas of jurisdiction (though their role was large y mamtained m
practice) • and (ii) that the Lands Department which managed the
lands in Northern Ghana could henceforth claim any land m the
North for "development purposes" without having to pay any
equitable compensation, and/or lease such land -as the Five-Year
Development Plan 1975/76-1979/80 has reeently emphasized - to
"individuals and institutions interested in undertakmg large-scale
farming". (4)
Following' the attainment of independence (1957), the 1931 Land
and Natfve Rights Ordinance was repealed by the State Proper y
and Contracts Act 1960 ( C . A . 6 ) . However, the new Act not only
vested the control of the Northern lands in question m the Pres-
ident of the First Republic but also exhorted him to exercise
that control for the "Public Service of the Republic". Two re-
marks are appropriate here:
- Since Act C . A . 6 dealt with state property and contracts, its
stated application to lands in Northern Ghana was mcongru-
ous and unfortunate. For the Northern lands in question had
never been declared state property during the colonial pen-
od.
- The wording of Section l of the said Act was even more un-
fortunate as it referred to "any property vested m the
crown as trustee for the Public Service of Ghana". However,
the Northern land had never been vested in the crown as
trustee for the Public Service of Ghana but rather m the
Governor as trustee for the chiefs and people.
In 1962, the Parliament of Ghana passed the Administration of
Lands Act 1962 (Act 123). In terms of this Act, the President
was empowered to declare by Executive Instrument apy stool
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lands (5) in Ghana äs vested in himself to hold in trust. Al-
though the State Property and Contracts Act 1960 had ostensibly
made action in terms of the Administration of Lands Act ünneces-
sary for Northern lands, 1963 nonetheless witnessed the promul-
gation of Executive Instruments 87 (relating to lands in the Up-
per Region) and 109 (relating to lands in the Northern Region).
The continuing vestment of Northern lands in the head of state
after independence must have arisen from the post-colonial
state's interest in acquiring Northern lands easily and inexpen-
sively for large-scale, mechanized cash-crop production.
The dichotomy in the land law of Ghana was not resolved by the
1969 Constitution of the Second Republic (Konings 1981a: 15-16).
The 1969 Constitution did, however, set out proposals for the
creation of a Lands Commission to manage the lands vested in
the president. The various responsibilities of this Lands Commis-
sion were later defined by the Lands Commission Act of 1971
(Agbosu 1980: 123).
The dichotomy in the land law of Ghana had to face increasing
Opposition in the 1970s from enlightened Northern chiefs and
intellectuals, the products of the extensive educational Invest-
ment in Northern Ghana during the Nkrumah period (1957-1966).
Numerous protests and appeals to the government resulted in
December 1977 in the state agreeing in principle to a memoran-
dum drawn up by the Ministry of Lands and Mineral Resources,
advocating the repeal of Executive Instruments 87 and 109 of
1963 and the return of the ownership of Northern lands to the
traditional owners. In order to ensure a smooth transfer to the
traditional owners, the Commissioner for Lands and Mineral Re-
sources decided to set up the R.L. Alhassan Committee "to de-
termine the ownership of lands and the position of tenants in the
Northern and Upper Regions", (6) The Alhassan Committee Re-
port was, however, never acted upon by the then military gov-
ernment, the SMC. The 1979 Constitution of the Third Republic
finally revested Northern lands in the traditional owners. (7)
The Post-Colonial State's Promotion of Capitalist Rice Farming in
Northern Ghana
The post-colonial state in Ghana has been increasingly concerned
with the country's recurring food shortages, high food prices,
and rising food imports (Konings 1981 a and b) . The record of
rice production clearly demonstrates the growing gap between
local production and demand: about 50-70% of Ghana's rice re~
quirements had to be imported between 1960 and 1970, thereby
considerably depleting Ghana's foreign exchange reserves
(Okoso-Amaa 1975:73). All post-colonial governments have con-
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sidered the peasantry - largely producing for its own subsis-
tence with "archaic" production tools - as incapable of meeting
the increased demand for food. Consequently they have mostly
relied on large-scale mechanized farming.
Northern Ghana - an area starved of development funds and
transformed under colonialism into a labor reserve for the South
Ghanaian export economy - features prominently in the post-
colonial state's attempts to promote large-scale, mechanized farm-
ing. Northern Ghana, as a colonial report noted in the early
fifties, "has three major assets, none of which have yet been
developed: large areas of unused land, rivers and labor" (8) ,
which make it an extremely suitable area for large-scale, mech-
anized farming. Vast tracts of uncultivated land were not only
available in the sparsely populated areas of Northern Ghana, but
also in the numerous river valleys in the more densely populated
regions of the North: the seasonally-flooded, heavy clay river
valley lands (fadama) are not arable with traditional farming
methods and are often infested with river blindness (Patterson
1978). The continuing vestment of Northern lands in the state
enabled post-colonial governments to claim such lands easily and
cheaply. Moreover, the North was considered to possess a large
reservoir of cheap, underemployed labor. The introduction of
large-scale, mechanized farming would then have the additional
advantage of halting, or at least slowing down, the southward
flow of unskilled labor - which can no longer be absorbed by the
slowly-expanding, capital-intensive industrial sector - and of
creating local employment opportunities in the vital agricultural
sector.
The failure of the large-scale, mechanized state farms and
co-operatives established during the Nkrumah period (1957-1966)
to raise food production (Miracle and Seidman 1968a and b; Due
1971), combined with the ideological commitment of subsequent
governments to the promotion of private enterprise, has laid the
foundation for capitalist (rice) farming in Northern Ghana (Shep-
herd 1979; Konings 1981a). A conscious effort was made by the
NLC military government (1966-1969), but particularly by the
subsequent civilian government (1969-1972), to create a class of
capitalist farmers among the urban-based "better-educated and
better paid" petty-bourgeois fractions in society (civil servants
and businessmen). The provision of foreign exchange to import
machinery and inputs, of highly subsidized inputs and agricul-
tural services (subsidies on fertilizer rose from 50% of cost in
1970 to 81% in 1976, while subsidies on agricultural services in-
creased from 50% to 74%) , of improved extension services geared
to "progressive farmers", and of a minimum of infrastructure,
and the establishment of various government rice milis in North-
ern Ghana (ensuring a - steadily rising- guaranteed floor price
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for paddy), have proved to be important ineentives to invest-
ment in capitalist rice farming. The expansion of capitalist rice
farming has depended above all else on bank loans. Investment
in rice production was initiated by the state-owned Agricultural
Development Bank (ADB) in 1968, and soon followed by the
foreign-owned commercial banks and the part state, part
privately-owned National Investment Bank (NIB). By the mid-
seventies there had arisen in the Northern towns an embryonic
class of capitalist rice farmers that was dependent on: a) the
state, for highly-subsidized inputs and agricultural services; b)
the banks, for low-interest loans; and c) the local peasant com-
munities, for easy access to cheap (uncultivated) land and
(casual) labor.
Capitalist rice farming started in the Northern Region, in partic-
ular the Tamale agricultural district, where there are numerous
uncultivated river valley lands. In 1976 there were, according to
Shepherd (1981: 174), some 800 bank-financed capitalist rice
farmers in the Northern Region. Capitalist rice farming started
later in the Upper Region where there is only one large river
valley suitable for large-scale, mechanized rice production,
namely the Gbedembilisi Valley in the Builsa Traditional Area.
Capitalist Rice Farming and Peasant Communities in the
Gbedembilisi Valley
The rice potential of the Gbedembilisi Valley (including the flood
plains of two rivers, the Sisili and Kulpawn, probably the most
fertile rice valley in the whole of Northern Ghana) was "dis-
covered" by four stranger farmers of Sisala origin in 1973
(Konings 1981a) . Their request for land to the regent of
Gbedembilisi (the chief having just recently died) was well re-
ceived, as the valley lands could not be cultivated by local peas-
ants with traditional farm implements and were only used for
grazing, fishing and hunting purposes. Moreover, these lands
were infested with river blindness. The Sisala group started
farming in 1974 and soon their pioneering efforts were bearing
fruit. Their success soon attracted a number of "followers" to
Gbedembilisi and Wiasi, the two "rice villages" on the Upper Re-
gion side of the valley, most of whom had obtained bank loans
from the ADB: while sixty rice farmers were in receipt of ADB
loans in 1975, their number had risen to 123 farmers in 1978, in
all cultivating 22,227 acres of land. Some of these farmers had
been granted loans from the commercial banks as well.
The first phase, 1974-1976, proved to be the most promising.
Particularly the 1976 bumper harvest attracted a large number of
newcomers (including many civil servants) to the Gbedembilisi
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Valley. However, from 1977 onwards, various calamities
(droughts and outbreaks of fire) and serious shortages of inputs
and machinery reduced the number of rice farmers (see table 1).
Table 1: Number of Rice Farmers at Wiasi and Gbedembilisi,
1974-1979
year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
number
4
73
153
210
135
60
Source: Konings 1981a: 60.
Most rice farmers who rushed to the valley to join the rice bo-
nanza were stranger farmers. In 1977, only twenty of the rice
farmers were Southerners, most of whom were relatively highly
educated civil servants, professionals, managers and military
officers stationed in the administrative/urban centers in the Up-
per Region. Only a handful of the remaining 190 Northerners
were Builsa: their number rose from 8 in 1975 to 14 in 1976 and
reached 23 in 1977. Among the Builsa there were only 5 farmers
from the two rice villages, including the two local chiefs. Most of
the Builsa were to be found among the small and least capitalized
farmers. Most of the other Northerners were members of neigh-
boring ethnic groups (Sisala, Mamprusi, Kasena and Frafra), but
there were also quite a number of Wala among them. Some of
these Northern farmers (especially the full-time farmers) stayed
in the rice villages or other Builsa towns during the farming
season; others were absentee farmers who visited their farm (s)
more or less regularly. Only very few stranger farmers stayed
(semi)-permanently in the Builsa towns, especially those who had
been - or still were - engaged in the cattle trade in the Builsa
area, the center of the cattle trade in the north-east of Ghana
(Hill 1970). The variety of ethnic groups did not prevent the
establishment of inter-ethnic ties among capitalist rice farmers
for purposes of mutual help and defence of their interests. The
under-representation and generally weak position of Builsa among
the capitalist rice farmers, however, constituted a potentially
explosive Situation. In the past, strangers wishing to settle
down on Builsa land were welcomed and given land freely (at the
time land was not yet a scarce commodity with commercial value;
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and only a tiny portion of Builsa land could be worked with tra-
ditional farming implements). However, the large-scale
"alienation" of Builsa lands to mechanized stranger farmers was
more likely to arouse Builsa ethnic feelings, the more so as most
of the farmers concerned did not intend to settle down on Builsa
land but were rather interested in "syphoning off" to their home
area the profits to be made there.
Capitalist rice farmers were, moreover, differentiated not only
along ethnic lines but also along occupational lines, a fact whicn
in turn gave rise to unequal distribution of socio-political power
and unequal access to scarce economie resources among capitalist
rice farmers and to intra-class conflicts (see table 2).
Table 2: Social Composition of Wiasi and Gbedembilisi Rice Farm-
ers in 1977
social position number %
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Military officers (including the
retired
Police and prison officers
Civil servants
Managers (banks, state and private
corporations)
Professionals (doctors, lawyers etc.)
Companies (Northern Engineering Co. etc.)
Chiefs
Ex-CPP politicians
Transport owners/drivers/mechanics etc.
Contractors
Businessmen/traders
Institutions/organizations
Co-operatives (of stranger "peasants")
(Mainly) farmers
total
15
4
38
9
6
6
7
3
15
7
47
3
2
48
210
7
2
18
4.5
3
3
3.5
1.5
7
3.5
22.5
1.5
1
23
100.0%
Source: Konings 1981a: 63.
Within the class of capitalist rice farmers, we may distinguish
the following fractions:
(1) The military/police officers and civil servants, constituting
the most powerful fraction within the class of capitalist rice
farmers. Hutchful 's thesis (1979: 36-55) to the effect that
the NRC/SMC military regimes (1972-1979), based on an alli-
ance bet ween the military and the bureaucracy, not only
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promoted capitalist enterprise but also used its political pow-
er to establish an economie base for its political power, is
borne out by this group's marked representation among capi-
talist rice farmers in the Gbedembilisi Valley. A good number
of the absentee military rice farmers were members of the
military regime itself or its close associates, such as
(retired) Regional Commissioners. The military and civil ser-
vants (but also other fractions like managers and profession-
als) were appropriating a large share of the state's and
banks' allocation of funds and resources to capitalist rice
farming in Northern Ghana. They belong to the most highly
capitalized group of farmers in the valley.
(2) Ex-CPP politicians. Both Ladouceur (1979: 214-215) and
Shepherd (1979: 71) refer to the important role ex-CPP poli-
ticians, unable to return to politics af ter the 1966 coup,
played in the establishment of capitalist rice farming in the
Northern Region. Their role in capitalist rice farming in the
Gbedembilisi Valley was much more modest. Only three im-
portant national and regional CPP politicians were farming in
the valley; they cultivated only a relatively small acreage.
(3) Chiefs. In the valley, the "traditional" wielders of power,
the chiefs, were to be found farming alongside the "modern"
wielders and ex-wielders of power. The Builsa paramount
chief, the Sandemnab, and two Kasena chiefs, the Navropio
and the Chianapio, acquired vast acreages of land in the
valley from locaï chiefs; they belonged to the group of most
highly capitalized farmers in the valley. Although the two
local (Gbedembilisi and Wiasi) chiefs belonged to the group
of least capitalized farmers, they were nevertheless able to
benefit in many ways from capitalist rice farming in the val-
ley (see below).
(4) Entrepreneurs/t raders/businessmen. Some rice farmers were
successful entrepreneurs like transport owners and contrac-
tors. A large number of them, such as the Muslim Wala (of-
ten engaged in cattle trade and other forms of trade) and
well-off Southern businessmen in Northern towns, had accu-
mulated "merchant capital" before embarking on rice farming.
Most of them did not intend to leave their business or trade
altogether. Rice farming provides them with a (potentially
lucrative) opportunity to spread risks, while it also makes
possible a constant re-cycling of capital from rice farming
into business/enterprise and vice versa.
(5) Full-time farmers. Although some of these farmers were
highly capitalized, like the four pioneering Sisala, most of
them had experienced difficulties in acquiring loans from the
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banks and agricultural inputs and services from the Ministry
of Agriculture. They resented the flow of scarce resources
to absentee farmers, a fact which made them - the "real"
farmers - offen dependent on the more highly capitalized ab-
sentee farmers for agricultural services. The establishment
of patron-client relationships was, moreover, of ten facilitated
(and made more easily acceptable) by ties of ethnicity and
religion (particularly Islam).
Capitalist rice farmers were able to benefit from local peasant
communities in two ways:
d) Acquisition of Jarge acreages of cheap valley land.
The acreage acquired generally varied from about 50 to over
1,000 acres, largely determined by the degree of the individual
farmers' capitalization. The rice farmers' acquisition of large
acreages of land has had some adverse consequences for local
peasant communities:
Though the rice farmers' acquisition of large tracts of land
has not (yet) resulted in the expropriation of peasants' land
(as the valley lands were not cultivated by peasants), it
blocked the peasants' access to grazing, hunting and fishing
lands. At the same time, such land appropriation has fore-
stalled the possible entry of peasants into large-scale rice
farming by either joining the ranks of capitalist rice farmers
(a possibility open only to the very few who have been able
to accumulate capital from cattle trade) or by forming
co-operative farms.
Many rice farmers - being stimulated by access to cheap land
and high state subsidies for agricultural services - practise
an ecologically-destructive, large-scale shifting cultivation:
they cultivate only a part of the land acreage acquired, with
httle regard to soil fertility maintenance (no proper land
preparation, fertilizing, and weeding, which require consid-
erable Investment) and shift to another part of their farm
(or to other farms acquired in the rice villages) when soil
fertility is depleted (Bennett and Schork 1979). Thus local
peasant communities - at least initially ignorant of this eco-
logically-destructive farming method - had large tracts of
land rendered useless over a short period of time.
While local peasant communities suffered from the allocation of
large tracts of valley lands to capitalist rice farmers, the real
beneficiaries were the local chiefs. Local chiefs behaved like
landlords through their "uncustomary" monopolization of land
allocation in the valley and their virtual rejection of the state
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control over Northern lands established during the colonial peri-
od:
a) Local chiefs vehemently opposed any rice farmer who tried to
acquire a lease from the Lands Department, which charged an
annual land rent of (2 0,50 an acre, to be distributed as follows:
10% to the collecting body, and 45% each to the Local Council and
Traditional Council respectively. Sotne farmers preferred a lease
from the Lands Department, as such a lease provided them with
a more secure title to land than a "customary" lease which could
in principle always be revoked. The following are some of the
reasons for the Opposition of local chiefs to leases issued by the
Lands Department:
their increasing rejection of the established land law, where-
by Northern Lands are vested in the head of state, and of
the Lands Department's management of such lands. A Lands
Department lease was considered as an infraction of the
chiefs power to administer lands under his jurisdiction, par-
ticularly when the prospective farmer did not first approach
the chief for a "note of introduction".
their fear that such leases might be interpreted as "sale of
land" contrary to the customary land tenure System.
the absence of a "token of respect" (customary gifts) for the
land-granting authority and of a share in the land rent paid
to the Lands Department (which rent accrued in part to the
Traditional Council rather than to the local chiefs).
Most rice farmers, fearing reprisals from the local chiefs, never
dared to apply for a lease from the Lands Department so as to
make their "customary" lease more secure. By 1977, only four
applications (including one from the Navropio and one from the
pioneering Sisala farmers) had been lodged with the Lands De-
partment at Bolgatanga; and only one of these applicants, Major
Achaab, a Builsa, was granted a lease by the Lands Department.
b) Local chiefs soon became aware of the value of the
Gbedembilisi Valley lands, a Situation which led to all kinds of
abuses of the customary land tenure System. These chiefs began
to look upon the valley lands as their personal property upon
which nobody - neither "traditional" nor "modern" authorities -
should intrude. Consent of the paramount chief was no longer
sought before leasing lands to stranger farmers, despite warn-
ings. Similarly, the teng-nyam were no longer being consulted;
in their turn, they refused to perform the necessary rites when
land was allocated by local chiefs to stranger farmers. Local
chiefs demanded more and more gifts and a higher monetary
amount - though this was still rather low compared with the
"drinks" demanded by chiefs in Southern Ghana (Konings 1982)
l
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- before leasing valley lands to farmers, and also began to raise
what could only be described as a sort of "ground rent". Thus,
in 1979, the Wiasi chief sent out a letter to all rice farmers in
his village, requesting ten bags of paddy af ter harvest. The
teng-nyam (and Community members) never received their proper
share of the gifts of appreciation donated by the rice farmers.
In addition to receiving "customary" gifts from rice farmers,
local chiefs were assisted by the former in setting up rice farms
of their own. Rice farmers, moreover, usually cultivated the rice
farms of the local chiefs.
(2) Supply of relatively cheap, casual labor.
The emergence of capitalist rice farming has created a dual labor
market in the Gbedembilisi Valley (Konings 1981a). Part of the
workforce employed is permanent - skilied and unskilled - labor,
usually recruited from the rice farmer's home area and closely
connected with the employers: the large majority of permanent
workers are either kinsmen or trusted and experienced men who
are often more or less incorporated into the employer's kin
group. The remainder of the workforce employed is casual labor,
usually recruited among local peasants in the rice villages. Capi-
talist rice farming has increased the flow of labor out of peasant
agriculture but partly re-directed it from the Southern export
economy to the local rice fields. Most casual workers are young
men and women who used to migrate to the South but now often
prefer to stay in the valley because of the employment oppor-
tunities created in the rice fields and the free accommodation and
food enjoyed in the family house. Widows and divorcees often
form part of the casual labor force as well. These casual workers
are often (still) denied access to land except for a small plot, so
they tend to work more or less regularly in the rice fields (par-
ticularly at times when their labor power is not badly needed on
the family farm) since such work enables them to secure, or
enlarge, an income of their own. Most older married men and
women, and in particular household heads, hardly look for em-
ployment in the rice fields; their responsibility is to look after
the family's upkeep through the cultivation of the family's food
farms. Household heads often attempt to start, or increase, po-
tentially lucrative race production; they are, however, usually
dependent on capitalist rice farmers for the provision of mech-
anized services and fertilizer. The shortage of (casual) labor in
the valley has had an upward effect on wages: while wages of
casual workers in the private agricultural sector in the North
used to be below the minimum wage (Rourke and Sakyi-Gyinae
1972), the existmg labor shortage in the valley has raised wages
at least to the daily minimum wage of (Z 4 in 1979 and mostly a
little above it ((t 5 was the most common wage in 1979). Casual
workers appreciate, on the one hand, the employment oppor-
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tumties created by capitalist rice farming, which provides them
witn an mcome that compares favorably with that of unskilled
urban workers. On the other hand, they often display quite
ambivalent attitudes towards capitalist rice farming in the vallev
they appear to share at least some of the elders' grievances.
The elders increasingly resent the allocation of vast tracts of
valley lands to mainly stranger farmers since this blocks their
own entry mto large-scale farming through the establishment of
co-operat,ve farms in the valley. They believe that the local
communities' supply of relatively cheap land and labor to rice
farmers has given rise to the latters' huge capital accumulation
with minimal local benefits. The rice produced in the vallev is
largely transported to the Southern urban markets or across the
Ghanaian borders, without (substantially) adding to the local
peasants' precarious food supplies. And the daily wage of 1 5
whi e comparing favorably with the wage rates of unskilled urban
workers, is not only very low in relation to the cost of living
but also easily spent. Moreover, stranger farmers »syphon off«
to their home towns the "huge» profits made on the valley lands
without m any way making a contribution to local "development"
Stranger farmers are regarded not only as exploiters of the locaï
communities' lands and labor but also as their actual "rulers"
following their "buying over» of the local chiefs. They are seen
as havmg created disunity between the local chiefs on the one
side, and the paramount chief, the teng-nvam and members of
the Community, on the other.
The emerging class conflict has not as yet given rise to any
form of organized Opposition, mainly for two reasons:
First of all, the peasant communities' leaders, the local
chiefs, have been "co-opted" into the class of capitalist rice
farmers and therefore protect the rice farmers as long
 as the
latter adhere to the terms of the land leases granted.
- Secondly local peasants depend on the rice farmers for the
supply of agricultural inputs and services (some elders) or
employment (particularly young men and women).
The conflict between the local peasants and the rice farmers is
however, discernible in informal, largely individualistic and'ne-
gative actions, mcluding the "harvesting" of rice in the fields
and occasionally, the burning of rice fields (Goody 1980) Whilê
local peasants were unable to establish any form of organized
Opposition agamst the rice farmers, their grievances werf aired
1
^ ,
 detended ^ the B^lsa Traditional Council
!f OUth,Association < B Y A ) . an organization
ute a, durmg the so-called Gbedembilisi Valley Dis-
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The Gbedembilisi Valley Dispute
The so-called Gbedembilisi Valley Dispute arose from a land dis-
pute between the four pioneering Sisala farmers and the Chief's
House of Gbedembilisi. However, this local dispute soon devel-
oped into a wider conflict between the Builsa (native) state, on
the one side, and the national state and stranger farmers, on
the other, over the control of Builsa land and the regulation and
taxation of capitalist rice farming in the valley, Though it ini-
tially appeared as though the BTC, supported and "guided" by
the BYA, was successful in its defence of Builsa interests
against the state and the rice farmers, its victory proved ulti-
mately to be a Pyrrhic one.
The Sisala farmers, as we have seen above, were welcomed by
the Gbedembilisi regent in 1973 and given a "customary" land
lease, with no size and duration specified (the consent of the
paramount chief, the Sandemnab, was, however, not sought).
When newcomers entered the valley in 1975, the Sisala farmers
requested, and obtained, the regent's permission to demarcate
their land. Thus a vast area of about 2 to 3 square miles of the
most fertile land in the valley became demarcated. However, the
regent allowed four new farmers to farm on as yet uncultivated
land within the recently demarcated area (for a handsome re-
ward!), thus blocking the Sisala farmers' future expansion pos-
sibilities. When the Sisala started to quarrel with the four new-
comers and lodged a protest with the regent, they were told to
stop farming in the valley because of their "greediness" (not
allowing other farmers access to as yet uncultivated land) and
that the land (according to the regent's new version) had only
be given to them for a two-year period. Furthermore, and this
point was later conceded by the complainants, they had
contravened custom (punishable by eviction) by subletting land
to Sisala "brothers" without the regent's knowledge and consent.
The Sisala farmers, in turn, did not seek redress, as custom
demanded, from the Paramount Chief, the Sandemnab, the custo-
dian of Builsa lands and arbitrator in any land disputes - they
suspected him of partiality to the Gbedembilisi Chief's House -
but directly approached the Regional Commissioner, Col.
Acquaye-Nortey. After having received a report on the dispute,
drawn up by the Builsa District Chief Executive, the RC ruled
that the Sisala had acquired the land with the regent's consent
and in accordance with customary law; hè rejected the
Gbedembilisi regent's quit order to the Sisala farmers as being
detrimental to the government's policy of achieving self-
sufficiency in food production (the Builsa, however, alleged that
the Sisala had "bought" the RC over by offering him help in the
establishment of a rice farm in the valley).
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The dispute was -still unresolved when Col. Acquaye-Nortey was
transferred and replaced by Major Ofori-Akuomoah who took up
the matter after the newly-elected Gbedembilisi chief again began
to allocate land within the demarcated area. At the time, the
Sandemnab had appointed a committee to investigate the matter.
The new RC, however, did not wait for the outcome of this arbi-
tration effort by the custodian of Builsa lands, but appealed to
the Upper Regional House of Chiefs for a settlement .of the dis-
pute. A two-man committee - comprising the president and ex-
president of the Upper Regional House of Chiefs, the Wellembele-
Kuoro (a Sisala himself!) and the Chianapio, both capitalist
stranger farmers in the Gbedembilisi Valley - was formed to "as-
sist" the Sandemnab in finding a suitable solution to the land
dispute. The appointment of the Wellembele-Kuoro Committee
aroused Builsa ethnic feelings. The BTC regarded the committee
as constituting an outside (state) interference in matters which
ought to be handled by its president, the Sandemnab, and as
being partial to the claims of stranger farmers and therefore
inimical to Builsa interests. (9)
The internal conflict within the BTC between the Sandemnab and
the Gbedembilisi chief - who had "recklessly" allocated land to
stranger farmers without seeking prior permission from the para-
mount chief as custom demanded - disappeared to the back-
ground when Builsa chiefs (BTC) and "intellectuals" (BYA) ral-
lied to defend Builsa interests against "outside" interests
(though the Gbedembilisi chief was reproached by the Sandemnab
during a BTC meeting and had to apologize). The dispute now
more and more assumed the character of a conflict between the
BTC, supported by the BYA, on the one hand, and the state
and stranger farmers, on the other, about control over Builsa
Lands and the "regulation" (and taxation) of rice farming in the
valley. Though the BTC, "guided" by the BYA, was not opposed
to state-supported capitalist rice farming in the valley, it wished
to guarantee and defend Builsa interests against those of the
state and stranger farmers by the following means:
a) Claiming control over Builsa land: The BTC maintained, in
the wake of increasing Opposition by Northern chiefs and
intellectuals to the established land law vesting Northern
lands in the head of state, that Builsa lands were vested in
its president, the Sandemnab, and disputed state interfer-
ence in Builsa land matters.
b) Attempting to regulate and streamline the System of land
allocation with regard to capitalist rice farming in the valley:
The introduction of capitalist rice farming in the Gbedembilisi
Valley had necessitated a rationalization and centralization of
the traditional System of land allocation so as to forestall
large-scale "alienation" of Builsa lands, to overcome the un-
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c)
equal distribution of lands in the valley and to prevent
breaches of custom. For that reason, the BYA, after having
investigated the causes of the dispute, proposed to the BTC
the setting up of a Land Allocation Committee which would
issue rules and regulations about land leases to capitalist
rice farmers and with which all agreements about land leases
would have to be re-negotiated.
Securing a larger Builsa share in the valley lands by allocat-
ing larger tracts of valley lands to Builsa farmers than to
stranger farmers and by organizing co-operatives among "our
poor people" for large-scale farming and by increasing the
local benefits from the farming of Builsa lands (by taxing
capitalist rice farmers for the benefit of the whole Builsa
area, which is one of the least developed areas in the North)
before stranger farmers, practising an ecologically-destruc-
tive, large-scale shifting cultivation, have left the area. (10)
The climax of the conflict was reached when the RC accepted the
main recommendations of the Wellembele-Kuoro Committee's Report
which stated (i) that the Sisala farmers should continue to culti-
vate land in the disputed area; and (ii) that other farmers
should be evicted but be given compensation for the plots ploug-
hed in the disputed area. (11) The Sandemnab strongly opposed
the conclusions of the report and ruled that "all farmers in the
area should continue to farm and préparé themselves to accept
and to abide by the decisions of the BTC which will meet soon".
(12) However, the RC sent Major Addah, Border Guards Com-
mander, and the Regional Agricultural Officer, to Gbedembilisi
with letters containing quit orders to the four farmers who had
been allowed into the disputed area by the Gbedembilisi Chief's
House. Remarkable in this regard was that a more recent "inva-
der" of the disputed area, Col. Felli, a prominent government
member, was not similarly ordered to leave by the RC.
Meanwhile the Gbedembilisi chief forbade a Ministry of Agricul-
ture survey team, instructed by the RC to survey the disputed
area, to carry out its work. Reportedly, the chief told the team
that since the land in question was Builsa land hè would only
allow them to undertake the survey on instructions from the
Sandemnab, the custodian of Builsa lands. (13) Enraged by the
chief's act of "sabotage" and his continuous refusal to allow the
S1Sala to farm in the disputed area, the RC went down person-
al^ to Gbedembilisi - thereby once again bypassing the
Sandemnab - to threaten the chief. He was, however, rebuffed
by the chief and constantly referred to the Sandemnab. The RC
took offense at the chief's behavior and made it clear that if the
Sisala were not allowed to continue farming on Builsa lands, ev-
l
Ir
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erybody should stop farming there. He thereupon imposed a ban
on the transport of agricultural inputs and machmery to the
whole Builsa area.
The ban took effect at the beginning of the 1976 farming season.
constituting a serious threat not only to capitalist agnculture m
£ area b«t also to peasants' livelihoods and hen«, creaUng
serious tensions within the Builsa commumty. The BTC linally
dec"ded to send a delegation to the Head of State with the re-
quest to withdraw the Wellembele-Kuoro Committee's Report and
?he banning order imposed by the RC. The BTC delegaüon won
the ear of the then Head of State, Gen. I .K. Achearnpong. The
Jatter reprimanded the RC, who happened to be m Accra at the
time, in the presence of the delegation, and appomted a commit
ee consisting of the two Regional Commissioners in Northern
Ghana and a Builsa, Lt.-Col. Abanah, to investigate the matter
with a view to finding a permanent solution. During a meeting
with the Sandemnab the committee was able to arnve at a settle-
ment, with the result that the ban was lifted. The committee
advised the BTC to draw up a set of rules and regulations gov-
erning the holding of farm lands in the valley so that similar
disputes might not arise in future. (14)
This powerful committee's advice, corresponding with earlier BYA
proposals to the BTC (see above), was used by the BTC as po-
litica! backing for its passing of a resolution durmg its session
of 31st March 1977, whereby absolute control over farm lands m
the Builsa Traditional Area became vested m the BTC. The reso-
lution (contrary to existing land law) was intended not only to
forestall any further state interference m land matters m the
BuHsa area but also to authorize the BTC to effect in the cus-
fomary S L the changes proposed by the BYA during the
dispute, in particular the rationalization and centrahzation of the
whole system of land allocation and the introduction of a system
of taxation in respect of capitalist rice farming. The BTC has no
such legal authority. The procedures for the making, ^Iteration
or modification of customary law are provided for m part VII of
the Chieftancy Act 1971, Act 370. Any proposal by a Traditional
Council to bring about changes in customary law should, accord-
ing to sections 41-43 of Act 370, be forwarded to, and
"screened" by the Regional and National Houses of Chiefs
respectively, and finally approved by the Head of State The
only action the BTC in fact took was to post the original of the
documents to the Regional Administrative Officer and to deposit a
copy of the documents with the District Chief Executive, neither
official having anything to do with the Implementation of the pro-
visions of sections 41-43 of Act 370. Thus, not only was the
resolution illegal, but so, too, was the procedure followed to
bring about changes in the customary law.
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The centralization of the land allocation System was achieved by
the formation of a Land Allocation Committee, under the chair-
manship of the Sandemnab, which was to be the sole authority
for the allocation of land in the Builsa Traditional Area. The
BTC Land Allocation Committee was composed of 2 BTC chiefs, l
chief from the village in question, l teng-nyono of the same vil-
lage, and 2 members of the BYA. Its membership therefore com-
prised both those who customarily dealt with land matters in the
Builsa Traditional Area, viz. the chiefs and teng-nyam, and
those who became involved in land matters after the introduction
of capitalist rice farming with its attendent conflicts, namely, the
educated Builsa (organized in the BYA) . The latter group was
"co-opted" particularly for its ability to put down in legally-
binding documents the unwritten code of customary land tenure
and the changes brought about in it. Such documentation was
more and more seen to be required to protect and defend the
local peasant communities' rights of ownership, Though the
wording of the resolution and other related documents might
suggest that the BTC Land Allocation Committee was to handle
land allocation in the whole Builsa area, its responsibility did not
in fact extend beyond the allocation of land to rice farmers in
the Gbedembilisi Valley.
The BTC Land Allocation Committee began to issue rules and
regulations with regard to capitalist rice farming. It took pains
to see to it that such rules and regulations were written down
and applied to all rice farmers without exception so as to obviate
any possible abuse. Discriminatory measures against stranger
farmers (proposed in earlier BYA documents), such as allocating
larger acreages of land to Builsa than to non-Builsa farmers,
were carefully avoided, as they might give rise to new conflicts
within the Gbedembilisi Valley. The BTC Land Allocation Commit-
tee issued the following main rules and regulations:
a) with regard to land allocation: All race farmers should
re-apply for farm lands in the valley; specific limits were set
to the acreage of a lease (a non-mechanized farmer would be
able to acquire not more than 100 acres, a mechanized farmer
not more than 100-150 acres, a Company/group not more than
200-500 acres) and to the duration of a lease (a term of 5
years subject to abrogation or renewal at the option of the
BTC Land Allocation Committee). This rule allowed for more
evenly distributed opportunities for capital accumulation
within the class of capitalist rice farmers in the valley.
b) with regard to taxation; All rice farmers should contribute
one bag of paddy per acre. The tax should be divided as
follows: one-third to be given to the village chief to share
between the teng-nyono of the area and himself, two-third to
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go to the BTC for development projects, scholarships, and
to meet the BTC commitments. (15)
Considering the nature of the rules and regulations issued by
the BTC Land Allocation Committee we may agree with Shepherd
(1979: 206) who has predicted that,
the centralization of the allocation of scarce resources, espe-
cially land, and the centralization and rationalization of the
collection and disposal of what amounted to a ground rent
... would increase the economie power of the traditional
council in a fashion unprecedented in Northern Ghana.
Not unexpectedly, the resolution and the new rules and regu-
lations governing capitalist rice farming gave rise to conflicts
with the state, the local chiefs of the rice villages and the capi-
talist rice farmers.
The state appointed an Administrative Committee on Allocation of
Farm Lands in Builsa District on 29 June 1977, to ascertain,
among other things, the real objectives and legality of the reso-
lution passed by the BTC and the füll implications of the con-
templated action in respect of rice farming. While pointing out
the illegality of the resolution in question, the committee never-
theless concluded that "having regard to the real objectives or
the intentions of the BTC we found the idea of making rules
along the lines of the resolution praiseworthy". (16) However, it
recommended that in trying to lay down such rules the BTC
would be well advised to proceed in accordance with sections
41-43 of Act 370. It furthermore wished to make some amend-
ments to the rules and regulations issued by the BTC Land Allo-
cation Committee, amendments geared at making the rules more
conducive to the development and expansion of capitalist rice
farming in the Gbedembilisi Valley. For example: there was in-
suf ficient security of tenure; the limits set on the acreage to be
leased might obstruct the capacity to expand of the more highly
capitalized farmers; the length of the leases should be extended
so as to enable farmers to pay off the loans and make enough
profit; and finally, the tax was judged as being too high. This
report was never published or acted upon by the state.
The formation of the BTC Land Allocation Committee once again
brought into the open the conflict between the BTC and local
chiefs of the rice villages (in particular the Gbedembilisi chief),
a conflict that had remained in the background during the whole
dispute. The local chiefs opposed the BTC Land Allocation Com-
mittee as an instance of "outside" interference in the matter of
land allocations in their "kingdoms". They feared a loss of reve-
nue as the BTC Land Allocation Committee would henceforth han-
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die the profitable allocation of lands in the valley. They also
disliked the new System of taxation which "syphoned off" the
largest proportion of the taxes to the BTC. The Land Allocation
Committee and the new rules and regulations were made into a
farce by the local chiefs' Opposition, the committee's failure to
devise an effective scheme of tax collection, and its hesitation
after issuing the new rules and regulations - the committee
wished to await government response (which never materialized)
to the Administrative Committee's Report on Allocation of Farm
Lands in Builsa District before actually imposing the new rules
and regulations and challenging the local chiefs. The great
losers in all this were the local peasants. While the BTC and
BYA had planned to make "room" for peasant participation in
large-scale rice farming in the valley, the Land Allocation Com-
mittee's failure to implement the new rules and its plans, coupled
with the local chiefs1 interest in the maintenance of the status
quo, prevented the organization of co-operatives by peasants.
Capitalist rice farmers, who initially appeared to be the losers in
the dispute, came out victorious in the end. The new rules and
regulations were never in fact imposed. The capitalist rice farm-
ers then directed their action against the "high" rate of taxation
which ultimately resulted in the reduction of the tax from l bag
per acre to (Z 0,50 a bag. The Land Allocation Committee's fail-
ure to devise an effective System of tax collection, moreover,
enabled the capitalist rice farmers to evade payment of taxes on
a large scale.
Conclusion
This study has tried to demonstrate that the introduction of cap-
itahst rice farming in peasant communities in North Ghana has
created serious tensions and conflicts about land and land allo-
cation.
The overall picture portrayed by accounts of the customary land
tenure Systems in Northern Ghana is that no economie value as
such was attached to land. Land was abundant, demand for it
was neghgible, and it thus had no market value. Hence claims of
right to or over it did not feature prominently in the customary
land tenure Systems. This was, according to Agbosu (1980: 111-
112), also one of the main reasons that the colonial administra-
tion did not experience any Opposition from traditional authorities
to the vestment of Northern lands in the state - in contrast to
Southern Ghana where land had already acquired a commercial
value during the pre-colonial period. Though the 1931 Land and
Native Rights Ordinance granted ultimate control over Northern
lands to the governor, hardly any tensions and conflicts about
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land and land allocation arose during the colonial period for the
following main reasons: (i) the administration of Northern Ghana
as a labor reserve prevented the commercialization of Northern
lands (Konings 1983); (ii) very little land was claimed by the
colonial administration for development purposes (mainly land in
towns for the purpose of establishing schools and administrative
buildings); and (iii) the "traditional" authorities were in practice
allowed to continue allocating agricultural land (consequently, a
number of Northern chiefs did not know that they had no legal
rights to allocate land).
The transformation of the North from a labor reserve into a
"granary" for the Southern economy after the attainment of inde-
pendence has given rise to the increasing commercialization of
Northern land (Konings 1983). Both the power and profit to be
gained from control over valuable land (amply illustrated by the
role of the chiefs in Southern Ghana's cocoa regions) and the
post-colonial state's actual expropriation of Northern lands for
large-scale, mechanized farming without any form of consultation
and compensation of local chiefs, have caused a growing resent-
ment among Northern chiefs against state control over Northern
lands. Supported by the expanding group of educated commoners
they started to protest against what they considered a discrim-
inatory and unfair land law vesting Northern lands - in contrast
to Southern lands - in the state. The direct effects of this pro-
test have been that the Lands Department has become more
careful during the seventies in issuing land leases to potential
farmers and that the 1979 constitution finally restored Northern
lands to the traditional owners.
State promotion of capitalist rice farming has led to a scramble
for land in the Gbedembilisi Valley, mainly by stranger farmers.
Neither the "modern" nor the "traditional" land law has proved
to be capable of regulating land allocation to rice farmers. Local
chiefs who soon became aware of the economie value of the river
valley lands, have not only constantly refused to sanction Lands
Department leases, but have also started to monopolize land allo-
cation to stranger farmers in clear defiance of the customary
land law. They have been rewarded in various ways for this
allocation exercise and have been co-opted into the class of capi-
talist rice farmers. Their allocation of river valley lands has
given rise to an unequal distribution of lands among capitalist
rice farmers, blocking local peasants' access to land in the valley
for mechanized rice farming, and has brought only minimal bene-
fits to local peasant communities and the whole Builsa area.
These were the sources of conflict which ultimately lay at the
root of the Gbedembilisi Valley Dispute.
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The Gbedembilisi Valley Dispute prompted the BTC not only to
reject the "modern" land law completely in order to forestall any
future state interference in land matters in the Builsa area, but
also to bring about changes in the customary land law so äs to
"regulate" and tax capitalist rice farming in the Gbedembilisi
Valley. The BTC Land Allocation Committee was given sole au-
thority to deal with land allocation to rice farmers in the
Gbedembilisi Valley. This committee imposed acreage ceilings and
strict time limits on land leases to rice farmers, allowing a fairer
distribution of existing rice land, and reserving the right to
reallocate land at a later period should the local Community de-
mand it; in addition, it devised a taxation System for capitalist
rice farming.
The BTC Land Allocation Committee could have constituted a
satisfactory solution to the tensions and conflicts about land and
land allocation created by the introduction of capitalist rice farm-
ing to the Gbedembilisi Valley. It had the necessary power to
limit and monitor closely the acquisition of land by stranger
farmers and to allocate land in the interest of local peasant com-
munities. However, its activities were finally thwarted by the
combined efforts of the state - which supports capitalist rice
farmers (including a good number of farmers closely allied with
the regime in power) - and local chiefs and capitalist rice farm-
ers interested in maintaining the status quo. The BTC Land Al-
location Committee's failure to "regulate11 capitalist rice farming
together with continuous state support of capitalist rice farming,
may not only stimulate a further expansion of capitalist rice
farming, but also sharpen the simmering conflict between local
peasants and capitalist rice farmers over the river valley lands.
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Dimbie II, Wellembele-Kuoro and President of the UR House
of Chiefs and P .E .R.A. Ayagitam, Chianopio and Member of
the UR House of Chiefs.
12. Letter from Sandemnab to RC Upper Region, Sandema
(BTC), 10 May, 1976.
13. Letter from Regional Agricultural Officer, Bolgatanga, to RC
Upper Region, Bolgatanga, 27 May 1976, ref. no.
R A O / U R / L S . 2 / vol. 2 /224 .
14 Report by the Three-Men Delegation sent by the Head of
State on the Gbedembilisi Valley Dispute, June 1976.
15. Minutes of the Meeting of the BTC Land Allocation Commit-
tee, 10 April 1977.
16 Report of the Administrative Committee on Allocation of Farm
Lands in Builsa District, 1977 (unpublished), pp. 58-59.
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